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Abstract 23 
Questions regarding the nature of non-human cognition continue to be of great interest within 24 
cognitive science and biology.  However, progress in characterising the relative contribution 25 
of “simple” associative and more “complex” reasoning mechanisms has been painfully slow 26 
– something that the tendency for researchers from different intellectual traditions to work 27 
separately has only exacerbated.  This paper re-examines evidence that rats respond 28 
differently to the non-presentation of an event than they do if the physical location of that 29 
event is covered.  One class of explanation for the sensitivity to different types of event 30 
absence is that rats' representations go beyond their immediate sensory experience and that 31 
covering creates uncertainty regarding the status of an event (thus impacting on the 32 
underlying causal model of the relationship between events).  A second class of explanation, 33 
which includes associative mechanisms, assumes that rats represent only their direct sensory 34 
experience and that particular features of the covering procedures provide incidental cues that 35 
elicit the observed behaviours.  We outline a set of consensus predictions from these two 36 
classes of explanation focusing on the potential importance of uncertainty about the 37 
presentation of an outcome.  The example of covering the food-magazine during the 38 
extinction of appetitive conditioning is used as a test-case for the derivation of diagnostic 39 
tests that are not biased by preconceived assumptions about the nature of animal cognition.    40 
 41 
Keywords:  Causal model, renewal, secondary reinforcement, ambiguity  42 
  43 
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“And no man, when he hath lighted a lamp, covereth it with a vessel, or putteth it under a 44 
bed: But he putteth it on a stand.”  Luke, Ch. 8, V 16. 45 
 46 
Putting lamps under bushels 47 
While a lamp under a bushel casts just as little light as an unlit lamp, the status of the 48 
unlit lamp is clear, while that of the covered lamp is uncertain – it may be lit or unlit.  49 
Although probably not the typical message taken from this parable, it exemplifies the fact 50 
that, considered rationally, there is a clear difference between the absence of an event, and the 51 
absence of information about that event.  One goal of the present article is to examine recent 52 
research on the capacities of rats to reason about hidden objects as a test case for examining 53 
distinctions between higher-level cognitive processes and basic associative mechanisms.  But 54 
before turning our attention to these empirical concerns we will comment, relatively briefly, 55 
on the sometimes rancorous debate concerning the commonalities and differences between 56 
human and non-human animal cognition. 57 
Comparisons between human and non-human animal cognition have attracted great 58 
interest in cognitive science and biology in the past decades.  Perhaps the dominant tradition 59 
has been to assume that non-human animals are convenient systems in which to study simple 60 
processes (e.g. of learning and memory), and their underlying biological substrates, 61 
untrammelled by the more complex reasoning and rule-based processes possessed by 62 
humans.  This view has been challenged by recent evidence which suggests that animals 63 
might, in addition to simple associative processes, also have far richer ways of representing 64 
the causal texture of their environment (e.g., Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; 65 
Fast & Blaisdell, 2011; Leising, Wong, Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008; Murphy, Mondragon, 66 
& Murphy, 2008; Waldmann, Schmid, Wong, & Blaisdell, 2012).  However, the potentially 67 
far-reaching implications of these studies depend on the idea that behaviours consistent with 68 
complex cognitive mechanisms are indeed the result of such complex mechanisms, and 69 
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cannot be explained as emergent properties of more simple (in particular associative) 70 
mechanisms (Burgess, Dwyer, & Honey, 2012; Dwyer, Starns, & Honey, 2009; Kutlu & 71 
Schmajuk, 2012).  A fundamental shortcoming of this debate is that it is not entirely clear 72 
how higher-level cognitive processes can theoretically and empirically be distinguished from 73 
basic associative mechanisms.  We present here a new proposal for making this distinction. 74 
In the literature, different proposals have been discussed on how to distinguish higher-75 
level cognition from associative processes.  The traditional view, inspired by behaviourism, 76 
was that cognitive but not associative theories postulate information processing mechanisms 77 
operating on mental representations of the world.  This distinction is no longer pertinent 78 
because many modern associative theories assume that animals possess mental 79 
representations, and characterise learning as the formation of associative links between these 80 
representations.  A prime example of this is the idea that classical conditioning reflects the 81 
formation of an excitatory association between mental representations of a conditioned 82 
stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) – an idea included in essentially all 83 
accounts of associative learning regardless of their differences concerning the details of the 84 
learning algorithm involved (e.g., Esber & Haselgrove, 2011; Harris, 2006; Le Pelley, 2004; 85 
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce, 2002; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 86 
1981).  While contemporary associative theory does include (and require) mental 87 
representations, it should be recognised that these are informationally “thin” representations, 88 
held to consist essentially as copies or traces of aspects of the sensory and motivational 89 
stimulation produced by experience of the stimulus (Heyes, 2012).  In particular, associative 90 
theories do not allow that either their representations or the links between them have semantic 91 
content – that is their truth value cannot be assessed.  In this sense “thick” representations are 92 
effectively propositional (i.e. they can be expressed as a statement with a truth value – e.g. 93 
“The light is on” – which is either true or false, and also allows the possibility “I don’t 94 
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know”).  In contrast, as a copy or trace of the activation produced by the stimulus, thin 95 
representations accord to nothing more than the set of nodes/elements that are activated by 96 
experience with the stimulus (or activated through associative links).  Therefore, it makes no 97 
sense to ask whether the activation is “correct”, it is merely a matter of whether activation 98 
exists and to what degree.  Although the fact that contemporary associative theory admits 99 
mental representations at all removes one classical divide between associative processes and 100 
complex cognition, the commitment to thin mental representations has one critical 101 
consequence:  It requires associative theory to deal only with the sample of events 102 
experienced by an organism and the activation of the representations that occur as a result of 103 
this experience.   104 
 105 
Levels of Representation 106 
Our main focus in this article is on causal representations.  Predicting and explaining 107 
events on the basis of observations and interventions is arguably one of the most important 108 
cognitive competencies that allow organisms to adapt to the world.  There are a vast number 109 
of competing theories specifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying this competency.  As 110 
a first approximation, we would like to propose two different classes of theories that can be 111 
distinguished on the basis of the postulated representations of the world.  Of course, within 112 
each class there are numerous competing variations that have been the focus of extensive 113 
research. 114 
Level 1: Sample-based theories: 115 
The basic assumption underlying this class of theories is that causal representations 116 
use representations of temporally ordered observed events (cues, outcomes) and that the goal 117 
of learning is to capture the statistical relations between these events.  Thus, the key 118 
assumption for our purposes is that Level 1 accounts assume that organisms do not (or 119 
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cannot) look beyond the observed sample of events.  The sample of learning events is what 120 
organisms know about the particular aspect of the world they observe. 121 
One of the key topics within this class of theories is to investigate which statistical 122 
rules organisms actually use to represent the observed covariations.  A large number of such 123 
rules have been proposed both within cognitive theories (e.g., Hattori & Oaksford, 2007; 124 
Perales & Shanks, 2007) and within associative theories (e.g., Dickinson, 2001; Le Pelley, 125 
Oakeshott, Wills, & McLaren, 2005; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987).  One thing all these 126 
otherwise competing theories have in common is that they compute some index of 127 
covariation from the learning sample, which encapsulates the effective strength of the causal 128 
relation.  Indeed, the fact that some associative and cognitive models make identical 129 
predictions under some circumstance – see for example relationship between the output of the 130 
Rescorla-Wagner model and delta-P metric discussed by Shanks (1995) – implies that these 131 
models often capture the same functional relationships between experienced events 132 
perspective (for a more detailed analysis of the implications of examining learning at a 133 
functional level see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; De Houwer et al., this 134 
volume).  In the present context, it is most important that such theories do not include a role 135 
for any awareness about the fallibility of experiences of the world (e.g., absence of evidence) 136 
or of the representations themselves (e.g., dreams, hallucinations vs. experiences of real 137 
events).  The fact that many associative models are based around error-correction 138 
mechanisms does mean that they calculate a prediction error between the associative 139 
activation of representational nodes and the activation produced by experience of events.  140 
However, this is an algorithmic comparison and does not require the organism to have a 141 
meta-representational appreciation of the current internal associative model, the current 142 
external input, and the relationship between them.  In short, sample-based theories do not 143 
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assume a meta-representational understanding by the organism of the distinction between its 144 
representation of the world and the world that produces that representation.   145 
Various research paradigms view human and non-human organisms as focusing on 146 
samples, unable to go beyond the information given.  In causal research, associative theories 147 
are a prime example of this class of theories.  Indeed, the fact that associative theories are 148 
characterised by a reliance on thin mental representations of stimuli and the links between 149 
them requires that they must focus on an organism’s sample of experience.  Thin 150 
representations do not allow an assessment of truth value, so there is no way in which the 151 
mental representation activated by a stimulus (or its activation through memory or associative 152 
means) can be evaluated as accurately corresponding to the outside world or not1.  Moreover, 153 
thin representations ascribe no content to an associative link other than as a means for 154 
specifying the degree to which activity of one representation will influence the degree of 155 
activation in a representation to which it is associatively linked.  As such associative accounts 156 
do not explicitly distinguish between causal and non-causal relationships between events.  157 
According to this sample-based class of theories, organisms encode the presence and 158 
absence of temporally ordered events and learn statistical covariations between these events. 159 
The strength of these covarations determines inferences or behaviour.  Rule-based theories of 160 
                                                          
1
 It is instructive to note here Holland’s (1990) work showing that stimulus representations 
activated associatively (“images” in his terminology) can elicit some of the same processing 
that occurs when the stimulus itself is presented.  The same body of work also established 
that the processing of retrieved images is not exactly the same as that for experienced events 
– so there is clearly some distinction between retrieved and directly activated stimulus 
representations.  However, when only thin representations are assumed then this distinction in 
what is activated by experience (the world) and through association (the image) is literally 
just that, a difference in what is activated – only from the outside can the different sets of 
activated elements be related to which set accords to the real world.  As we will see later, 
recent model-based accounts are very different in assuming that there is some ability to 
distinguish the model from the experience. 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 8 
 
causal reasoning are another example (for a review, see, Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2013). 161 
These theories debate which exact covariation rule organisms employ.  But as in the 162 
associative framework, statistical covariations are based on what is observed in a sample.  In 163 
social psychology, there is also a variant of the sample view (see, Fiedler, 2012; Fiedler & 164 
Juslin, 2006).  Here the claim is that judgmental biases are often caused by distortions in the 165 
observed or retrieved sample of experiences.  Fiedler (2012) argues that humans are largely 166 
unable to understand and correct statistical distortions in the sample.  He has labelled this 167 
deficit “metacognitive myopia.”  168 
Level 2: Causal Models: 169 
This class of theories assumes that organisms go beyond the information given when 170 
learning about causal relations to make inferences about an underlying unobservable causal 171 
model (see Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006).  Of course, going beyond the sample 172 
is not an all-or-none feature. There are different degrees of inferences transcending the 173 
sample, and different organisms may differ in the extent to which they are capable of going 174 
beyond the information given (for an example within causal model theory, see Waldmann, 175 
Cheng, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2008).  176 
A key difference between causal and associative theories concerns the links between 177 
causes and effects.  Causal links, often depicted as arrows, are directed from cause to effect.  178 
In associative theories, temporal order determines whether an association is excitatory or 179 
inhibitory, but this alone does not result in the explicit representation that the first event 180 
caused the second.  Indeed, causal and temporal order can be dissociated (e.g., Waldmann, 181 
2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992).  For example, physicians often observe the symptoms 182 
(i.e., effects) prior to diagnosing the cause.  The exact meaning of the causal arrows differs 183 
across theories, but the general assumption is that causal processes are unobservable and need 184 
to be inferred based on observations and prior knowledge.  For example, Cheng’s (1997) 185 
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power PC theory assumes that people are capable of inferring the power of a cause based on 186 
covariation and background assumptions.  Power is a point estimate of the unobservable 187 
probability of the cause generating or preventing a specific effect in the hypothetical absence 188 
of background factors. 189 
A less abstract account assumes hidden forces and causal mechanisms that transfer 190 
some kind of conserved quantity (such as linear momentum or electric charge to take 191 
examples from physics) between causes and effects (see Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2013, for a 192 
review).  Although causal mechanisms can sometimes be elaborated as chains of observable 193 
variables, the variables within the chain are connected via arrows that code some kind of 194 
hidden flow of a conserved quantity (Dowe, 2000).  Mechanism theories do not necessarily 195 
assume elaborate knowledge, as it is well known that human laypeople often have no or only 196 
very sketchy knowledge of the exact relationships between events (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002).  197 
The assumption rather is that people understand a relation between two events as causal if 198 
they assume that there is some kind of mechanism that links the events, even if the details of 199 
this mechanism are largely unknown. 200 
A more recent development in causal model theory goes one step further in separating 201 
observed samples from underlying unobservable generating models.  Inspired by Bayesian 202 
statistical inference, it is assumed that a rational approach to causal inference would require 203 
taking into account the fact that samples are noisy reflections of the hidden generating causal 204 
models.  Thus, depending on statistically relevant factors, such as sample size, samples carry 205 
more or less uncertainty about the structure and the parameters of the causal model.  206 
According to this view, organisms are mainly interested in a faithful representation of the 207 
characteristics of the causal model, and therefore need to take into account uncertainty when 208 
making inferences.  A number of studies have demonstrated that human subjects are indeed 209 
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sensitive to statistical uncertainty (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, 210 
Cheng, & Holyoak, 2008; Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014)2. 211 
 212 
Testing the Level of Representation 213 
Level 1 associative and Level 2 causal model theories are often pursued in separation. 214 
A typical research strategy of those interested in either class of account is to design studies 215 
that test between competing theories within their class – while questions of between-class 216 
comparisons tend to be considered most seriously only after publication when conclusions are 217 
challenged externally.  For example, it is not uncommon for alternative associative Level 1 218 
“killjoy” (Shettleworth, 2010) accounts to be developed in a post-hoc fashion after novel 219 
patterns of behaviour had been discovered based on predictions of Level 2 theories.  In this 220 
light it is rather unsurprising that progress in this area often appears meagre: if for nothing 221 
else than publication lag “conversations” in the literature are incredibly slow.  In addition 222 
there is often a strong bias for Level 2 theorists to interpret data that is consistent with 223 
predictions of their complex accounts as evidence for their theory without considering the 224 
possibility that level 1 accounts of the same data might be available (this is especially 225 
prevalent when human subjects are involved).  When alternative Level 1 accounts are 226 
considered, this consideration is often constrained by a lack of familiarity with contemporary 227 
associative theory.  On the other hand, the emergent properties of Level 1 theories are not 228 
always apparent without considering the exact experimental situation and by themselves 229 
                                                          
2
 The nomenclature we have adopted (Level 1 vs Level 2) is entirely abstract and we admit 
that this may appear uninformative, but the choice was quite deliberate.  While we focus here 
on the nature of the representations assumed at each level and the differences in terms of the 
explicit role of causal relationships, the distinction between these two classes of model goes 
beyond causality (as our subsequent discussion of theory of mind illustrates).  Thus the 
abstract nomenclature avoids overly-restrictive characterisations of the model classes we are 
discussing. 
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Level 1 theories commonly provide little guide to the investigation of the sort of phenomena 230 
predicted by Level 2 theories.  For example, it was only after Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, 231 
and Smith (2010) published their analysis of delayed feedback as supporting a (Level 2) 232 
metacognition account of primate behaviour in a discrimination task that Le Pelley (2012) 233 
was able to simulate their experimental procedures with a (Level 1) reinforcement learning 234 
account.  Similarly, the demonstration that rats’ behaviour can diverge as a function of 235 
whether a cue appears as a result of their actions or not followed from the prediction from a 236 
(Level 2) causal model account suggesting a critical difference between seeing and doing 237 
(Blaisdell et al., 2006).  Only following the publication of the experimental methods used to 238 
produce this demonstration could Kutlu and Schmajuk (2012) examine the possibility that 239 
their associative model might be able to simulate the observed behaviour3.  Thus, Level 1 240 
theorists often need to await progress within Level 2 theories before they can address the 241 
question of whether the discovered phenomena genuinely require complex representations or 242 
can also be explained by a Level 1 account.  One possible response to these systemic 243 
problems is the direct collaboration between researchers from different theoretical 244 
perspectives.  245 
Of course, developing an alternative Level 1 account for a phenomenon generated by 246 
Level 2 research is only the first step.  Although considerations of simplicity enshrined in 247 
Morgan’s Canon (Morgan, 1894) have often led researchers, at least from the associative 248 
camp, to favour Level 1 over Level 2 theories, it should be remembered that the Canon is (at 249 
best) a guide to interpretation and does not have any logically probative status (for a more 250 
detailed discussion of this point, see Heyes, 2012).  Indeed, any heuristic arguments that 251 
                                                          
3
 This far from a one-way relationship as demonstrated by the example of Bayesian reasoning 
accounts (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009) developed to explain cue-
competition effects such as backward blocking that were first reported in the associative 
literature. 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 12 
 
might be applied – from considerations of parsimony to appeals to predictive or explanatory 252 
scope – cannot on their own conclusively decide between Level 1 and Level 2 accounts.  As 253 
ever in science, empirical data are paramount, and thus the most productive research strategy 254 
is to develop competing Level 1 and Level 2 accounts of a phenomenon and then deploy 255 
experimental paradigms that allow differentiation between them. 256 
But before moving to consider a test case for a targeted empirical comparison of 257 
Level 1 and Level 2 theories, we should emphasise that they are not necessarily mutually 258 
exclusive.  In cognitive psychology, two-process theories (see, Evans, 2012) have become 259 
increasingly popular.  One example, related to our target phenomenon, is the two-process 260 
model of theory of mind inferences by Apperly and Butterfill (2009).  A typical task in this 261 
domain is the Sally scenario in which the protagonist Sally hides an object, which in her 262 
absence is transferred to a different location.  The key finding is that children younger than 4 263 
seem unable to understand that Sally will look at the place she has hidden the object 264 
regardless of the current location.  When asked where she will go, young children tend to 265 
point to the actual location of the object.  Fully understanding this situation requires the 266 
competency to have meta-representations that separate reality from (possibly erroneous) 267 
mental representations.  Many researchers argued that young children as well as animals lack 268 
such meta-representational capacities.  In the last decade, however, researchers using more 269 
implicit habituation paradigms have demonstrated some level of understanding of this task 270 
even in infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005).  Apperly and Butterfill therefore postulate two 271 
separate processes that may underlie the responses in the different tasks.  Whereas infants 272 
may only understand that agents look for something where they have seen it last, older 273 
children may reason with more complex meta-representations, which in the beginning stages 274 
of reasoning leads to the observed errors.  According to the two-process view, some species 275 
may only be capable of reasoning with the simpler process, whereas others may have both 276 
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types of processes at their disposal.  Critically however, even for these sort of two-process 277 
accounts, the question remains as to whether a particular behaviour is (or can be) supported 278 
by the simpler process or only the more complex one.  So the importance of determining the 279 
representational level at which an organism is functioning remains germane even from the 280 
perspective of dual-process accounts.  281 
 282 
Hidden Events: A Simple Test Case for Sensitivity to Uncertainty 283 
The present article will discuss a fairly simple potential indicator of uncertainty, 284 
uncertainty about the status of events.  Level 2 causal model accounts would differentiate 285 
between two possible causes for the failure to experience an expected event:  Either the event 286 
is really absent in the world, or the event is present but access to it is being prevented in some 287 
fashion.  Waldmann et al. (2012) examined a test-case for this possibility in the extinction of 288 
Pavlovian appetitive conditioning.  In their experiments, rats were presented with three 289 
learning and test phases.  In Phase 1, an association between a cue (CS), a light, and sucrose 290 
(US) was established through a Pavlovian conditioning procedure (a 10s light was presented 291 
and the offset of the light followed by 10s access to a sucrose-filled dipper)4.  In Phase 2, the 292 
extinction phase, the cue was paired with the experience of absence of sucrose (the light was 293 
presented in advance of the empty dipper – i.e. the dipper arm was raised for 10s, but the 294 
trough did not contain sucrose, so no primary reward was presented).  Then in Phase 3, the 295 
degree of extinction was tested by presenting the light cue without sucrose (again, the empty 296 
dipper continued to be presented).  The crucial manipulation involved Phase 2.  In one 297 
                                                          
4
 The food magazine was positioned above a trough containing sucrose solution.  A 
mechanical dipper arm, with a small cup on the end, was immersed in this solution.  Sucrose 
access was provided by raising the arm so that the cup protruded through a hole in the base of 
the food magazine for 10s before being lowered again.  The rats could not access either the 
dipper arm or the sucrose except when it was raised.  
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condition, the No-Cover condition, rats could directly observe that sucrose was actually 298 
absent from the food magazine, whereas in the alternative Cover condition a metallic plate 299 
was placed over the magazine preventing rats from accessing it.  The test phase showed that 300 
rats differentiated between these conditions with greater test phase responding to the CS in 301 
the Cover than the No-Cover condition.  Moreover, it was not merely the presence of the 302 
metallic plate that controlled responding, because a control condition where the plate was 303 
included without preventing access to the food magazine did not prevent extinction.  304 
As noted above, the causal model account would interpret this finding as evidence 305 
that rats are capable of differentiating between two possible causes of the absence of sucrose 306 
in the extinction phase:  Either the sucrose is really absent, or it is present but access is 307 
blocked.  This inference requires an understanding of uncertainty of the status of events.  In 308 
other words, initial training experience should create a light causes sucrose model.  The 309 
transition from the rewarded training phase to the non-rewarded extinction phase could 310 
potentially create an ambiguity in a causal understanding of the situation – has the causal 311 
relationship changed, and the light no longer causes sucrose to appear, or is the relationship 312 
still is intact but the sucrose has for some other reason not been observed?  This ambiguity 313 
would be emphasised when access to the usual source of sucrose delivery was prevented 314 
during extinction – although the light is still experienced without sucrose, both possible 315 
causal structures are still consistent with the experience because there is no direct 316 
disconfirmation of the expected sucrose delivery.  Thus a causal model analysis would 317 
suggest that covering the sucrose magazine should attenuate the effects of extinction and help 318 
preserve the light causes sucrose model.  In turn, preserving a causal relationship between the 319 
light and sucrose should result in higher responding in the test phase - which is exactly what 320 
happened (Waldmann et al., 2012).  Clearly, a full causal understanding of this situation 321 
requires some kind of understanding of the difference between the representations of the 322 
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world and the actual world.  Even in humans, unless people have philosophical training, this 323 
differentiation is unlikely to be explicitly available.  It suffices that in specific cases absence 324 
is distinguished from lack of evidence. 325 
Functionally the separation between experience and world has a number of potential 326 
advantages for organisms.  If experience and the world were collapsed, every instance of 327 
disappearance due to another object blocking sight would lead to a fading of the 328 
representation of the object although it is still present behind the occluder.  Since such 329 
experiences are common, the physical representation of the world arising from such 330 
inferences would be very different from ours.  Work on object permanence with animals 331 
seems to indicate that many animals may not think that objects behind an occluder actually 332 
disappear from the world (Gómez, 2004, 2005).  Similarly, in Waldmann et al.’s (2012) study 333 
organisms that only represent present and absent events and do not differentiate between 334 
absence in the world and lack of evidence would represent events in Phase 2 (extinction) as a 335 
gradual change of contingency.  Although this is certainly a possibility, as the No-Cover 336 
condition demonstrates, it is not necessarily adaptive to always make this inference.  One key 337 
feature of causal relations is that they tend to be stable and do not suddenly change (Pearl, 338 
2000).  Thus, the capacity to distinguish between different causes of experienced absence is 339 
potentially adaptive for an organism that has the goal of forming veridical representations of 340 
the causal texture of the world and if these veridical representations improve the organism’s 341 
success in interacting with the world. 342 
 343 
Associative Accounts of Hidden Events: Renewal and Secondary Reinforcers 344 
 As described above, a causal model account based on uncertainty can explain why 345 
covering the food magazine during extinction might result in higher levels of responding 346 
during test.  However, the details of the experiments performed also admit alternative 347 
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explanations of the same results based entirely on associative Level 1 mechanisms:  We will 348 
consider one based on response prevention5, a second based on renewal theory, and another 349 
on a consideration of conditioned reinforcement. 350 
Rescorla (2001) notes that there is typically a direct relationship between the amount 351 
of non-reinforced responding in extinction and the degree to which such non-reinforcement 352 
impacts on future behaviour.  For example, following tone-food pairings, presentation of the 353 
tone alone will typically result in some degree of responding to the food magazine during an 354 
extinction phase, while devaluation of the food reward or satiating the animals reduces the 355 
level of extinction phase magazine responding.  Even though the number of unrewarded tone 356 
alone presentations is unaffected by devaluation or satiation, these treatments which reduce 357 
extinction phase magazine responding also reduce the effectiveness of extinction (Holland & 358 
Rescorla, 1975).  On the basis of such results, Rescorla (2001; see also Colwill, 1991) 359 
suggested that learning not to make a particular response may make a critical contribution to 360 
the decrement in responding typically observed in extinction.  One direct corollary of this 361 
idea is that the effects of non-reward in extinction will be reduced if the original response is 362 
not produced.  In the present circumstances, covering the magazine clearly prevents the target 363 
response of magazine entry, and thus prevention of this response should protect it from 364 
extinction.  Not only does this provide a simple explanation of why test phase responding was 365 
be higher after the magazine was covered in the extinction phase, it also explains why 366 
introducing a similar metallic cover that did not prevent access to the magazine had little 367 
effect.  368 
A second associative account of the effects of the magazine cover comes from 369 
renewal theory.  This approach suggests that extinction should be specific to the context in 370 
                                                          
5
 We would thank one of the reviewers of an earlier version of this paper for their suggestion 
of this possibility.  
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which it occurs, and that extinguished responses should reappear when testing occurs in a 371 
situation more akin to the original training context than to the context of extinction (e.g., 372 
Bouton, 2004; Delamater, 2004).  In the current situation, the cover provided during 373 
extinction could act as a context change, so its removal would comprise a return to the 374 
original training context, thus supporting the re-emergence of responding.  Thus, according to 375 
this view rats would gradually start to represent Phase 2 as a situation in which the light is 376 
paired with the absence of sucrose, but expression of this new association would be restricted 377 
to the context in which extinction took place.  This possibility was acknowledged in the 378 
original report of these experiments, and in Experiment 3 of that paper an additional control 379 
group was used in which the metal “cover” was inserted into the apparatus during the 380 
extinction phase, but did not actually prevent access to the food magazine.  This control, in 381 
which the presence or absence of a cover could have acted as a cue separating the extinction 382 
and text contexts, resulted in performance that was no different to that in the No-Cover 383 
condition.  However, it may be argued that a cover preventing access to a source of food is 384 
more salient than a cover placed elsewhere, in which case a magazine cover would be a more 385 
effective contextual cue than one that does not cover the magazine.   386 
It should be noted that in all the Cover conditions the sucrose dipper continued to be 387 
raised and lowered, but that there was “no noticeable vibrations for the human ear” (p. 983, 388 
Waldmann et al., 2012), that could be discerned inside the experimental chamber.  That is, 389 
covering was assumed to have prevented all access to information about the operation of the 390 
dipper during extinction6.  Thus in the covering situation, the training and test contexts were 391 
                                                          
6
 It should be noted that this assumption was not directly tested, and given that rat and human 
sensory abilities are somewhat different then it is certainly plausible that the rats in 
Waldmann et al.’s (2012) experiments were able to sense some aspect(s) of the dipper’s 
operation behind the cover.  Although this possibility has no direct impact on the ideas 
discussed here, it does raise the issue of what predictions the different accounts of the 
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similar in the operation of the dipper but diverged from the extinction context in both respects 392 
– while in the No-Cover, and the plate without covering conditions, the extinction and test 393 
contexts both included the operation of an empty dipper.  In short, covering the magazine in 394 
the extinction phase of the experiments produced several potential cues that could have 395 
differentiated the extinction and test contexts.  This could support the recovery of 396 
extinguished responding in the covered condition without reference to any Level 2 397 
mechanisms.   398 
The final alternative account of the covering data we will consider here relies on 399 
secondary reinforcement.  Remembering that the training phase of these experiments was 400 
based on pairing the light with a sucrose filled dipper, the training phase should establish 401 
light-sucrose, light-dipper, and dipper-sucrose associations.  It is well known that animals 402 
will respond both to cues paired with primary reinforcers - i.e. the sucrose in these studies - 403 
and also secondary reinforcers - i.e. any stimulus that is associated with a primary reinforcer 404 
(for reviews see, Mackintosh, 1974; Mackintosh, 1983).  In these studies the dipper would 405 
have accrued secondary reinforcing properties by being paired with sucrose during the 406 
training phase.  Following this, all groups received light-alone presentations in the extinction 407 
phase - presumably extinguishing light-sucrose associations to a similar extent between 408 
groups.  In the No-Cover condition the empty dipper would also be experienced – resulting in 409 
the extinction of the dipper-sucrose associations, and thus the removal of secondary 410 
reinforcing properties of the dipper.  However, in the Cover condition, the dipper would not 411 
be experienced at all during the extinction phase, which would protect the dipper-sucrose 412 
associations and preserve the conditioned reinforcement properties of the dipper.  In turn, this 413 
would allow the dipper to support responding to the light when the light was again paired 414 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
covering effect might make regarding “partial” covers (e.g. explicitly preventing vision but 
not audition). 
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with the dipper in the test phase.  In short, the training phase paired the light cue with both a 415 
primary (sucrose) and a secondary (the sucrose-paired dipper) reinforcer.  Covering the 416 
magazine in the extinction phase of the experiments could preserve the secondary reward 417 
properties of the dipper compared to the uncovered conditions.  The secondary reinforcing 418 
properties of the dipper could support additional test-phase responding in the covered 419 
condition without reference to any Level 2 mechanisms.   420 
 421 
Divergent predictions from Level 1 and Level 2 accounts of hidden events 422 
One important feature of the causal uncertainty and renewal/secondary reinforcement 423 
accounts of the effects of covering the magazine is that the differences between them relate 424 
directly to the nature of the division between Level 1 and Level 2 theories outlined 425 
previously.  The causal model account suggests that uncertainty produced by the cover would 426 
preserve the strength of a light causes sucrose model in the face of experiencing the light 427 
without sucrose.  This goes beyond the direct sample of experience because the fact that 428 
sucrose did not follow the light is discounted due to a distinction between absence of sucrose 429 
(the No-Cover case) and absence of evidence (the Cover case).  That is, the effects seen in the 430 
test phase are a product of covering producing uncertainty over whether the sucrose did or 431 
did not occur, and thus reducing the effective level of extinction.  In contrast, the three 432 
associative accounts considered here all related to direct effects of the cover in extinction or 433 
its removal at test.  The response-prevention account suggests that covering reduces the 434 
effects of extinction because the target response could never be produced when the magazine 435 
was covered.  Both the renewal and secondary reinforcement accounts assume that extinction 436 
does occur due to experience of the light without sucrose, but that responding returns in the 437 
test phase due to events that happen during that test:  For renewal theory, the critical event in 438 
the Cover condition is that the context of test is different from that of extinction (it allows 439 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 20 
 
access to the magazine and includes an operating dipper – as in training but not extinction);  440 
For secondary reinforcement, the critical event is that the rats experience the light paired with 441 
the dipper, and in the Cover condition the dipper will be a secondary reinforcer (but not in the 442 
No-Cover condition, because then the previous experience of the empty dipper has removed 443 
the secondary reinforcing properties of the dipper) – these test phase light-dipper pairings 444 
support the re-acquisition of responding to the light.  That is, the associative accounts are 445 
sample-based as they refer only to events that are actually experienced (or not experienced, in 446 
the case of prevented responses).  Therefore, empirical tests of the divergence between these 447 
accounts speak not only to the particular details of each of them, but also to the more general 448 
division between Level 1 and Level 2 processes in the context of this behavioural procedure7.  449 
Effects of manipulating dipper presentation: 450 
Given that the status of the dipper in the extinction and test phases is critical to two of 451 
the Level 1 sample-based accounts, while uncertainty concerning the presence of reward is 452 
central to the Level 2 causal model account, one empirical test would be to manipulate the 453 
presence of the dipper during these phases.  That is, to compare the pattern of responses 454 
between groups that receive either: (A) training and testing as in the original paper with the 455 
empty dipper presented during the extinction and test phases; or (B) with no presentation of 456 
the empty dipper during either the extinction or test phases (i.e. the dipper would remain 457 
lowered – but not be explicitly removed from the chamber).  Table 1 outlines the proposed 458 
experiment and summarises the key predictions of each of the accounts for responding to the 459 
light at the beginning of the test phase of the experiment.  The original experiments included 460 
control conditions which received extinction without the magazine cover.  Such controls are 461 
                                                          
7
 Of course, it is also possible to assess how causal models might account for the direct 
effects of test phase events, but this would not address our current concern with whether rats 
are able to go beyond the sample of their experience in terms of the explicit role for 
uncertainty.   
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needed to establish a baseline for levels of responding after effective experimental extinction, 462 
and we would propose including such uncovered controls which would receive extinction and 463 
test with or without dipper presentation in the current experiment.  Although it is likely that 464 
the operation vs. non-operation of the dipper would influence the rate of experimental 465 
extinction, we will not considered these control conditions in any detail because (as in the 466 
original experiments) the extinction phase would be continued until responding to the light 467 
has stopped, and so all theoretical accounts would predict negligible test phase responding.  468 
The derivation of the predictions for the critical magazine cover conditions is fleshed out in 469 
turn for the causal model, response prevention, renewal, and secondary reinforcement 470 
accounts. 471 
In both the Dipper Cover and No-Dipper Cover conditions the training phase would 472 
produce a light causes sucrose model.  In the extinction phase, the light occurs alone, but 473 
because access to the magazine is blocked the light causes sucrose model will be protected 474 
because the covering means that the status of the sucrose is uncertain and thus the evidence 475 
for sucrose not appearing is partially or totally discounted in terms of relevance to the light-476 
sucrose relationship.  Covering might also protect the light-sucrose causal relationship 477 
because it leads to the formation of a more complex causal model whereby the light causes 478 
sucrose but the action of an external event stops this being expressed (e.g. the cover stops 479 
access to the delivered sucrose).  In the test phase, the cover is removed – so behaviour will 480 
be determined by the light causes sucrose model (i.e. moderate to high responding is 481 
predicted).  Critically, the extinction phases for the Dipper Cover and No-Dipper Cover 482 
conditions are the same. In both conditions, the dipper and sucrose are covered during 483 
extinction so the causal model at the start of test should be the same.  In turn, this same causal 484 
model predicts that the response to the light at the start of test would be the same in these two 485 
conditions.  Of course, as the test phase continues, then the Dipper Cover and No-Dipper 486 
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Cover conditions will have different experiences.  Thus their causal models, and levels of 487 
responding, may be expected to diverge across testing: for example, the non-operation of the 488 
dipper might support the formation of a more complex causal model whereby the light causes 489 
sucrose only through the action of the dipper, which for some reason did not operate (e.g. the 490 
dipper was stuck).  However, the dipper is operated at the end of the light during training, so 491 
at the time of responding is assessed (during the presentation of the light) there is no direct 492 
evidence to indicate whether or not the dipper will operate on that trial.  So even if 493 
responding is dependent on the expectation of dipper operation, this expectation should only 494 
decline gradually as the light is encountered without the dipper following immediately 495 
afterwards.  Irrespective of these issues, responding early in the test phase should remain 496 
diagnostic of the strength of the light-sucrose causal relationship at the end of the extinction 497 
phase to the extent that causal representations are stable (Pearl, 2000). 498 
The predictions of the response-prevention account are simple – in both the No-499 
Dipper Cover and Dipper Cover conditions the cover will prevent the production of magazine 500 
entry responses.  To the extent that extinction requires the production of the relevant 501 
response, then such response prevention will attenuate the effects of extinction, and levels of 502 
magazine responding to the light would be predicted to be high at the start of the test phase.  503 
As outlined above, the renewal account suggests that the training phase should 504 
establish an excitatory light-sucrose association, while presenting the light without the reward 505 
in extinction will create an inhibitory light-“no sucrose” association.  Responding at test will 506 
be determined by the degree to which these two associations are expressed – something that 507 
is controlled by the similarity of the extinction and test phase contexts.  For the Dipper Cover 508 
condition, the test phase and the extinction phase differ in two critical respects, access to the 509 
magazine and the operation of the dipper: both of which are absent in the extinction phase 510 
and present at test.  Thus, the extinction and test contexts are quite different which will 511 
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attenuate the expression of the inhibitory light-“no sucrose” association formed in extinction 512 
and result in responding to the light on the basis of the originally-formed excitatory light-513 
sucrose association – a classic renewal effect.  In contrast, for the No-Dipper Cover 514 
condition, the test phase and the extinction phase differ with respect to access to the 515 
magazine, but are the same with respect to the non-operation of the dipper.  Thus, while there 516 
will be some difference between the extinction and test contexts in the No-Dipper Cover 517 
condition, and thus some degree of renewal would be expected, this should not be as great as 518 
in the Dipper Cover condition.  As the non-operation of the dipper can only be observed after 519 
the first trial, this difference between the Dipper and No-Dipper conditions should emerge 520 
across the extinction phase.  521 
Finally, the conditioned reinforcement account is based on the potential contribution 522 
of the dipper as a secondary reinforcer due to its pairing with sucrose in the training phase of 523 
the study.  In the Dipper Cover condition, the light is presented in the absence of either the 524 
primary or secondary reinforcer during the extinction phase – so by the end of extinction 525 
there will be no effective source of primary or secondary reinforcement.  However, the 526 
secondary reinforcing properties of the dipper will be preserved through the extinction phase 527 
because the dipper is never experienced without sucrose.  In the test phase, the light will 528 
again be presented in conjunction with the dipper, and thus the secondary reinforcing 529 
properties of the dipper will support responding to the light (at least for as long as the dipper 530 
remains an effective secondary reinforcer).  Obviously, this secondary reinforcing effect of 531 
the dipper could only be apparent after the first trial of the extinction phase.  The No-Dipper 532 
Cover condition will also result in the removal of any effective source of primary or 533 
secondary reinforcement by the end of the extinction phase, but in this case dipper operation 534 
is not reintroduced at the test phase.  So test phase responding to the light will be low in this 535 
condition.   536 
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In summary, all accounts predict that, if the dipper continues to be presented, then 537 
covering the magazine in extinction will result in higher levels of test phase responding than 538 
if the magazine is uncovered in extinction.  Two of the associative accounts – renewal and 539 
secondary reinforcement – predict that this covering effect will be reduced or removed if the 540 
dipper is not presented after the training phase.  In contrast, uncertainty within a causal model 541 
account and the response prevention account both predict that the effects of covering the 542 
magazine will be preserved, at least in the initial trials of the test phase in which the absence 543 
of the dipper is not yet apparent.   544 
Importantly, these predictions emphasise the test phase as a whole.  However it has 545 
already been noted that the presence or absence of the dipper might produce changes in the 546 
levels of responding across the test phase.  We have not considered trial-by-trial effects in the 547 
predictions we have described thus far.  The predictions of associative theories regarding 548 
changes during extinction depend on the assumed learning parameters.  Cognitive theories 549 
would predict that changes of expectation depend on prior knowledge about causal stability 550 
within the learning domain (e.g., physical vs. social).  Little is known about these effects. 551 
However, the very first trial of the test phase is different from all subsequent trials because 552 
the response to the light is assessed before the dipper is presented (or not presented) and so 553 
the Dipper versus No-Dipper manipulation cannot influence responding on the first test trial.  554 
The impact of this fact is particularly clear in terms of the secondary reinforcement account 555 
as it predicts that responding should emerge after only after the light is followed by the 556 
dipper.  Similarly, the renewal account predicts some responding to the light on the first trial 557 
in the Dipper Cover and No-Dipper Cover conditions (because the removal of the cover is a 558 
return to part of the training context), but only after the first trial will the Dipper vs No-559 
Dipper manipulation contribute to the context change between extinction and test phases.  560 
Therefore, it should be recognised that the theoretical accounts we have presented here do 561 
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imply that responding could vary in a systematic fashion across trials, and that the different 562 
accounts make divergent predictions about such trial-by-trial effects.  That said, it should also 563 
be acknowledged that the variability in responding that motivates the usual practice of 564 
aggregating across multiple trials may make a reliable assessment of such fine-grained 565 
predictions difficult in practice. 566 
Sign-tracking vs. Goal-tracking: 567 
Thus far, we have discussed responding to the light, following light-sucrose pairings, 568 
entirely in terms of a single measure – magazine entry.  However, Pavlovian conditioning can 569 
establish a range of possible responses when a cue stimulus is paired with reward (Boakes, 570 
1977).  In particular, a distinction is made between sign-tracking, i.e., responding directed 571 
towards the conditioned stimulus, and goal-tracking, i.e., responding towards the 572 
unconditioned stimulus (for recent examples of this distinction in the context of cues 573 
predicting food reward, see  Flagel, Watson, Robinson, & Akil, 2007; Meyer et al., 2012).  In 574 
the present context, the original light to sucrose training should establish both a sign-tracking 575 
response (e.g. orientation to the light) and a goal-tracking response (e.g. entry to the sucrose 576 
magazine).  Clearly, covering the sucrose magazine in extinction will prevent animals from 577 
producing the same goal-tracking responses they produced in the training phase, but would 578 
have no impact on the production of sign-tracking responses to the light.  Therefore, an 579 
examination of sign-tracking and goal-tracking responses would shed some light on the 580 
mechanisms underpinning the effects of covering the food magazine during extinction.  On a 581 
practical note, sign-tracking to a light can be assessed by videoing the animals and measuring 582 
the number of times the orient to the light.  However, many studies of sign- vs goal-tracking 583 
have used a retractable lever as the CS (Flagel et al., 2007; Meyer et al., 2012).  Here, a lever 584 
is inserted and removed from the box just as a light may be turned on and off.  Critically, the 585 
lever is entirely a signal; there is no need for the rats to press it in order for the reward to be 586 
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delivered.  Despite this, rats will still approach and press the lever, and thus sign-tracking can 587 
be measured by the number of lever presses, while goal tracking can continue to be assessed 588 
through magazine entry.  Table 2 outlines a proposed experiment using these techniques and 589 
summarises the key predictions of each of the accounts in terms of sign and goal tracking 590 
responses.  This experiment would use a lever as the cue in place of the light used in previous 591 
experiments to facilitate recording of sign-tracking responses, but all other aspects of the 592 
experiment would remain the same.  That is, the critical condition involves covering the food 593 
magazine in the extinction phase.  We will focus our analysis on this condition although a 594 
control group receiving extinction without the magazine would still be needed to establish the 595 
effects of experimental extinction for comparison purposes.  As before, the derivation of 596 
these predictions is fleshed out in turn for the causal model, response prevention, renewal, 597 
and secondary reinforcement accounts. 598 
 The predictions of the causal model approach are based on the uncertainty 599 
surrounding the appropriate causal structure.  However, cognitive theories have not as yet 600 
addressed how exactly expectations translate into different types of behaviour.  Because the 601 
relationship between model-based expectation and behavioural measures have not been the 602 
subject of detailed consideration we have assumed here that, for all responses, a simple 603 
monotonic function relates the degree of expectation of reward to the level of response8.  604 
Critically rats that are sign-tracking respond towards to a cue to the extent that it reliably 605 
predicts reward, and rats that are goal-tracking respond to the site of reward delivery during 606 
the presentation of the cue, again, to the extent that the cue reliably predicts rewards.  Thus 607 
both sign- and goal-tracking behaviours are determined by the cue to reward relationship.  In 608 
terms of the causal model account described here this reflects the strength of the light causes 609 
                                                          
8
 This represents a minimal assumption which allows the causal model approach to reflect the 
fact that both goal- and sign-tracking behaviours occur.  It also focuses our analysis only on 
the effects of uncertainty regarding sucrose presentation in the extinction phase.   
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sucrose model.  As described above, this model might be protected from the effects of 610 
extinction through the creation of uncertainty about the status of the reward by covering of 611 
the magazine.  Under these preliminary assumptions, the consideration of uncertainty within 612 
the causal model account predicts that both sign- and goal-tracking responses will be affected 613 
by covering the sucrose magazine during the extinction phase.  614 
As noted above, covering the magazine will prevent goal tracking (i.e. magazine 615 
entry) responses, but would not prevent sign-training (i.e. lever press) responses.  To the 616 
extent that extinction requires the production of the relevant response, then covering the 617 
magazine will attenuate the effects of extinction on goal-tracking responses but will not 618 
influence the extinction of sign-tracking responses.  Therefore, the action of response 619 
prevention alone predict that levels of magazine responding to the light would be high at the 620 
start of the test phase, while levels of lever press responding would be low. 621 
With respect to the renewal account, the local context for the goal-tracking response is 622 
the magazine.  Covering the magazine is a distinct and salient change to this local context and 623 
so the covering manipulation will mean that magazine responses at test will occur in a 624 
different context to that experienced during extinction.  As described above, this difference in 625 
context between extinction and test phases should produce renewal and thus levels of 626 
magazine responding (i.e. the goal tracking response) would be expected to be high at test.  In 627 
contrast, the local context for the sign-tracking response is the lever, which is not directly 628 
affected by the covering manipulation.  Thus, although the global context will differ between 629 
extinction and test due to the presence/absence of the magazine cover, the local context for 630 
sign-tracking responding will be the same for extinction and test.  This similarity in the local 631 
context for extinction and test should act to support generalisation of learning in extinction to 632 
the test phase.  Thus, while some renewal is expected for sign-tracking responses, this will 633 
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less than that seen for goal-tracking, and so renewal theory predicts that levels of lever-press 634 
responding at test would be moderate.  635 
The predictions of the secondary reinforcement account are somewhat less 636 
categorical.  Both sign- and goal-tracking after covering should relate to the same CS-US 637 
relationship – where the effective US here is the conditioned reinforcement provided by the 638 
dipper.  So if covering preserved the conditioned reinforcing properties of the dipper then 639 
both sign- and goal-tracking responses should return after the dipper is paired with the light 640 
during test.  However, there are large individual differences between animals in the levels of 641 
sign- and goal-tracking responses they produce (Flagel et al., 2007; Meyer et al., 2012), and 642 
animals that display a preponderance of sign-tracking responses may have a reduced 643 
opportunity to interact with the conditioned reinforcer during the test phase.  If so, then the 644 
conditioned reinforcement account also predicts a greater effect of the covering manipulation 645 
on goal-tracking than sign-tracking responses.   646 
In summary, how uncertainty is translated into sign- and goal-tracking behaviours has 647 
not been specified yet within the class of theories which includes causal model approaches.  648 
Under the preliminary assumption that all responses reflect the strength of the underlying 649 
light causes sucrose model, the causal model account predicts that sign- and goal-tracking 650 
responses will both be affected by the magazine covering manipulation because uncertainty 651 
about the status of the sucrose reward will protect this causal model.  The three Level 1 652 
associative accounts all relate to direct effects of the covering manipulation through either 653 
preventing only one of the target responses in extinction, having different effects on the local 654 
context for lever press and magazine entry responses, or by influencing the interaction with 655 
the secondary reward.  Thus the response competition and renewal accounts (and to a less 656 
certain extent the secondary reinforcement account), predict that goal-tracking responses 657 
should be more sensitive to magazine covering in extinction than sign-tracking responses.  658 
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 659 
Summary and comparisons to previous approaches 660 
 In the initial parts of this paper we outlined a distinction between two general classes 661 
of theoretical accounts: Level 1 – which refers to accounts that focus on the representations 662 
of events as experienced by the organism, and (in associative versions of such account at 663 
least) involve only thin, non-semantic representations of events and the links between them; 664 
and Level 2 – which refers to accounts that are focused on the idea that sensory experience is 665 
the basis for forming models of the events in the world and the nature of the relationships 666 
between them (with a particular focus on causal relationships), and thus involve explicitly 667 
semantic representations of events.  We then considered one test case involving extinction of 668 
a classically conditioned CS-US relationship, where covering the food magazine during the 669 
extinction phase attenuated the effects of that extinction in a subsequent test.  While both 670 
Level 1 and Level 2 accounts of the observed behaviour are available, these accounts make 671 
divergent predictions about the effects of manipulating the details of how the reward was 672 
delivered and the nature of the response assessed.  Critically, these divergent predictions 673 
speak directly to the level at which the theoretical accounts were based:  The Level 1 674 
accounts are based only on sensitivity to manipulations influencing the precise events 675 
experienced by the animals in the test phase; while the Level 2 account we have considered is 676 
focused on how covering the magazine creates uncertainty regarding the presence or absence 677 
of the reward, which in turn will impact on how experiencing the absence of sucrose modifies 678 
the causal model of the situation that was established during initial training.  This influence of 679 
uncertainty on the light causes sucrose model is explicitly a level 2 account as it clearly goes 680 
beyond the direct effects of the sample of events experienced.  681 
 It should, of course, be noted that while the predictions of the four accounts 682 
(uncertainty in causal models, response prevention, renewal, and secondary reinforcement) 683 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 30 
 
are clear, it would be entirely possible to make post-hoc revisions or additions to them.  For 684 
example, a renewal theorist may suggest that the key feature of the context was not the dipper 685 
but some other aspect of the magazine.  Moreover, it should be emphasised that we have 686 
focused the causal model account entirely on the effects that covering might have by inducing 687 
animals to go beyond the direct effects of experience through creating uncertainty.  But all 688 
causal theories, regardless of their sensitivity to uncertainty, also assume Level 1 contingency 689 
learning competencies.  For example, on a causal account one could assume that the dipper is 690 
part of the causal model learned in the acquisition phase (light-dipper-sucrose) so that its 691 
absence in the test phase would lead to changes of expectation.  These changes would be 692 
solely due to Level 1 causal contingency learning which should be unaffected by the cover 693 
manipulation in the extinction phase.  That said, the current experiments do make a direct 694 
comparison between an explanation in terms of uncertainty alone (i.e. an example of a Level 695 
2 “beyond the sample” account) and explanations in terms of particular local features of the 696 
manipulations (i.e. examples of Level 1 “sample-based” accounts).  Thus, while the two 697 
experimental manipulations described here do not comprise a definitive and general test of 698 
causal model theory and its associative alternatives on their own, they do provide a specific 699 
test of whether uncertainty over the presence or absence of reward considered alone is able to 700 
explain the behaviour of animals in the current extinction situation.   701 
We think it is instructive to compare our current approach – based on directly 702 
examining one key (Level 2) aspect of a causal model account – with previous approaches.  703 
In addition to the extinction experiments considered here, there are several other 704 
demonstrations that preventing rats having access to the source of significant stimulus events 705 
results in behaviour that is materially different to the simple non-presentation of those events 706 
(Blaisdell, Leising, Stahlman, & Waldmann, 2009; Fast & Blaisdell, 2011).  These other 707 
covering experiments were discussed by Dwyer and Burgess (2011), but only to present 708 
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Level 1 associative accounts of the observed behaviours and to dismiss the originally-709 
proposed Level 2 accounts entirely on the basis of an appeal to Morgan’s Canon.  That is, 710 
there was no discussion of how to make an empirically-based comparison between the 711 
alternative accounts let alone any report of new or relevant empirical data.  So, while the 712 
Dwyer and Burgess analysis was of value in providing an existence-proof of an associative 713 
account, it makes no progress towards determining whether the behaviour of the rats was 714 
under the control of Level 1 or Level 2 mechanisms.   715 
In summary, the current paper attempts to approach the investigation of the cognitive 716 
mechanisms underpinning the behaviour of human and non-humans animals without bias 717 
from preconceived assumptions regarding the prior probability of one account over another.  718 
This approach supported the derivation of diagnostic empirical tests focusing on the key 719 
feature of the current situation (i.e. the effect of uncertainty) which divided the current 720 
theoretical accounts on the basis of the general level of representation they instantiate.  Of 721 
course, the proof of this particular pudding is in the baking, and we are in the process of 722 
preparing to run exactly the studies we outline here.   723 
 724 
 725 
  726 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 32 
 
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and 727 
belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116(4), 953-970.  728 
Blaisdell, A. P., Leising, K. J., Stahlman, W., & Waldmann, M. R. (2009). Rats distinguish 729 
between absence of events and lack of information in sensory preconditioning. 730 
International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 22(1), 1-18.  731 
Blaisdell, A. P., Sawa, K., Leising, K. J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2006). Causal reasoning in 732 
rats. Science, 311(5763), 1020-1022.  733 
Boakes, R. A. (1977). Performance on learning to associate a stimulus with positive 734 
reinforcement. In H. Davis & H. M. B. Hurwitz (Eds.), Operant Pavlovian interactions 735 
(pp. 67-97). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 736 
Bouton, M. E. (2004). Context and behavioral processes in extinction. Learning & Memory, 737 
11(5), 485-494.  738 
Burgess, K. V., Dwyer, D. M., & Honey, R. C. (2012). Re-assessing causal accounts of learnt 739 
behavior in rats. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 740 
38(2), 148-156.  741 
Cheng, P. W. (1997). From covariation to causation: A causal power theory. Psychological 742 
Review, 104, 367-405.  743 
Colwill, R. M. (1991). Negative discriminative stimuli provide information about the identity 744 
of omitted response-contingent outcomes. Animal Learning & Behavior, 19(4), 326-745 
336.  746 
Couchman, J. J., Coutinho, M. V. C., Beran, M. J., & Smith, J. D. (2010). Beyond Stimulus 747 
Cues and Reinforcement Signals A New Approach to Animal Metacognition. Journal 748 
of Comparative Psychology, 124(4), 356-368.  749 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 33 
 
De Houwer, J., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Moors, A. (2013). What is learning? On the nature and 750 
merits of a functional definition of learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(4), 751 
631-642.  752 
Delamater, A. R. (2004). Experimental extinction in Pavlovian conditioning: Behavioural and 753 
neuroscience perspectives. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B-754 
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 57(2), 97-132.  755 
Dickinson, A. (2001). Causal learning: An associative analysis. Quarterly Journal of 756 
Experimental Psychology, 54B(1), 3-25.  757 
Dowe, P. (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 758 
Dwyer, D. M., & Burgess, K. V. (2011). Rational accounts of animal behaviour? Lessons 759 
from C. Lloyd Morgan's canon. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 24, 760 
349-364.  761 
Dwyer, D. M., Starns, J., & Honey, R. C. (2009). "Causal Reasoning" in rats: A reappraisal. 762 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 35(4), 578-586.  763 
Esber, G. R., & Haselgrove, M. (2011). Reconciling the influence of predictiveness and 764 
uncertainty on stimulus salience: a model of attention in associative learning. 765 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 278(1718), 2553-2561.  766 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2012). Dual-process theories of reasoning: Facts and fallacies. In K. J. 767 
Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 768 
115-133). New York, NY: Oxford University Press; US. 769 
Fast, C. D., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2011). Rats are sensitive to ambiguity. Psychonomic Bulletin 770 
& Review, 18(6), 1230-1237.  771 
Fiedler, K. (2012). Meta-cognitive myopia and the dilemmas of inductive-statistical 772 
inference. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol 57 (Vol. 773 
57, pp. 1-55). 774 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 34 
 
Fiedler, K., & Juslin, P. (2006). Information sampling and adaptive cognition. New York, 775 
NY: Cambridge University Press; US. 776 
Flagel, S. B., Watson, S. J., Robinson, T. E., & Akil, H. (2007). Individual differences in the 777 
propensity to approach signals vs goals promote different adaptations in the dopamine 778 
system of rats. Psychopharmacology, 191(3), 599-607.  779 
Gómez, J. C. (2004). Apes, monkeys, children and the growth of mind. Cambridge, MA: 780 
Harvard University Press. 781 
Gómez, J. C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends in 782 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(3), 118-125.  783 
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir, T., & Danks, D. (2004). A 784 
theory of causal learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological 785 
Review, 111(1), 3-32.  786 
Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Theory-based causal induction. Psychological 787 
Review, 116(4), 661-716.  788 
Harris, J. A. (2006). Elemental representations of stimuli in associative learning. 789 
Psychological Review, 113(3), 584-605.  790 
Hattori, M., & Oaksford, M. (2007). Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation 791 
detection in causal induction: Model comparison and rational analysis. Cognitive 792 
Science, 31(5), 765-814.  793 
Heyes, C. (2012). Simple minds: a qualified defence of associative learning. Philosophical 794 
Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 367(1603), 2695-2703.  795 
Holland, P. C. (1990). Event representation in Pavlovian conditioning: Image and action. 796 
Cognition, 37, 105-131.  797 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 35 
 
Holland, P. C., & Rescorla, R. A. (1975). The effect of two ways of devaluing the 798 
unconditioned stimulus after first- and second-order appetitve conditioning. Journal of 799 
Experimental Psychology-Animal Behavior Processes, 1(4), 355-363.  800 
Kutlu, M. G., & Schmajuk, N. A. (2012). Classical conditioning mechanisms can 801 
differentiate between seeing and doing in rats. Journal of experimental psychology. 802 
Animal behavior processes, 38(1), 84-101.  803 
Le Pelley, M. E. (2004). The role of associative history in models of associative learning: A 804 
selective review and a hybrid model. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 805 
Section B-Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 57(3), 193-243.  806 
Le Pelley, M. E. (2012). Metacognitive monkeys or associative animals? Simple 807 
reinforcement learning explains uncertainty in nonhuman animals. Journal of 808 
Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 38(3), 686-708.  809 
Le Pelley, M. E., Oakeshott, S. M., Wills, A. J., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2005). The outcome 810 
specificity of learned predictiveness effects: Parallels between human causal learning 811 
and animal conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Animal Behavior 812 
Processes, 31(2), 226-236.  813 
Leising, K. J., Wong, J., Waldmann, M. R., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2008). The special status of 814 
actions in causal reasoning in rats. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 815 
137(3), 514-527.  816 
Lu, H., Yuille, A. L., Liljeholm, M., Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (2008). Bayesian 817 
generic priors for causal learning. Psychological Review, 115(4), 955-984.  818 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1974). The psychology of animal learning. Oxford, England: Academic 819 
Press. 820 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli with 821 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82, 276-298.  822 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 36 
 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1983). Conditioning and associative learning. Oxford: Carendon Press. 823 
Meder, B., Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2014). Structure induction in diagnostic 824 
causal reasoning. Psychological Review, 121(3), 277-301.  825 
Meyer, P. J., Lovic, V., Saunders, B. T., Yager, L. M., Flagel, S. B., Morrow, J. D., & 826 
Robinson, T. E. (2012). Quantifying individual variation in the propensity to attribute 827 
incentive salience to reward cues. PLoS ONE, 7(6).  828 
Morgan, C. L. (1894). An introduction to comparative psychology. London, England: Walter 829 
Scott Publishing Co; England. 830 
Murphy, R. A., Mondragon, E., & Murphy, V. A. (2008). Rule learning by rats. Science, 831 
319(5871), 1849-1851.  832 
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? 833 
Science, 308(5719), 255-258.  834 
Pearce, J. M. (2002). Evaluation and development of a connectionist theory of configural 835 
learning. Animal Learning & Behavior, 30(2), 73-95.  836 
Pearce, J. M., & Hall, G. (1980). A model for Pavlovian learning: Variations in the 837 
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological Review, 838 
87, 532-552.  839 
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 840 
Perales, J. C., & Shanks, D. R. (2007). Models of covariation-based causal judgment: A 841 
review and synthesis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(4), 577-596.  842 
Rescorla, R. A. (2001). Experimental extinction. In R. R. Mowrer & S. B. Klein (Eds.), 843 
Handbook of contemporary learning theories (pp. 119-154). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 844 
Erlbaum. 845 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in 846 
the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black & W. F. 847 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 37 
 
Prokasy (Eds.), Classical Conditioning II: Current theory and research. (pp. 64-99). 848 
New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts. 849 
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of 850 
explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 521-562.  851 
Shanks, D. R. (1995). Is human learning rational? Quarterly Journal of Experimental 852 
Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology, 48A(2), 257-279.  853 
Shanks, D. R., & Dickinson, A. (1987). Associative accounts of causality judgment. In G. H. 854 
Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and 855 
theory (Vol. Vol. 21, pp. pp. 229-261). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press, Inc. 856 
Shettleworth, S. J. (2010). Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative 857 
psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(11), 477-481.  858 
Wagner, A. R. (1981). SOP. A model of autonomic memory processing in animal behavior. 859 
In N. E. Spear & R. Miller (Eds.), Information processing in animals: Memory 860 
mechanisms (pp. 5-47). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, Associates, Inc. 861 
Waldmann, M. R. (2000). Competition among causes but not effects in predictive and 862 
diagnostic learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and 863 
Cognition, 26(1), 53-76.  864 
Waldmann, M. R., Cheng, P. W., Hagmayer, Y., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2008). Causal learning in 865 
rats and humans: a minimal rational model. In N. Chater & M. Oaksford (Eds.), The 866 
probabilistic mind. Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science (pp. 453-484). Oxford: 867 
Oxford University Press. 868 
Waldmann, M. R., & Hagmayer, Y. (2013). Causal reasoning. New York, NY: Oxford 869 
University Press; US. 870 
Uncertainty & associations in rats - 38 
 
Waldmann, M. R., Hagmayer, Y., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2006). Beyond the information given: 871 
Causal models in learning and reasoning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 872 
15(6), 307-311.  873 
Waldmann, M. R., & Holyoak, K. J. (1992). Predictive and diagnostic learning within causal-874 
models: Asymmetries in cue competition. Journal of Experimental Psychology-875 
General, 121(2), 222-236.  876 
Waldmann, M. R., Schmid, M., Wong, J., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2012). Rats distinguish between 877 
absence of events and lack of evidence in contingency learning. Animal Cognition, 878 
15(5), 979-990. 879 
Table 1 – Dipper Manipulation 
Condition Train Extinction Test Uncertainty &  
Causal Model 
Response Prevention Renewal Secondary Reinforcement 
Dipper 
Cover 
Light 
to 
sucrose 
filled 
dipper 
Light alone 
& dipper 
magazine 
covered 
Light 
to 
empty 
dipper 
Status of reward 
uncertain in extinction 
phase – this protects 
light causes sucrose 
model.  Expression of 
causal model at test 
supports responding to 
light. 
 
I.e. Test phase 
responding moderate to 
high (depending on 
degree of protection by 
uncertainty). 
 
Cover prevents 
magazine response, 
therefore extinction 
effect of light alone 
presentation reduced 
for this response. 
 
I.e. Test phase 
responding high. 
 
Extinction and test phases differ 
in presence of the cover and 
dipper operation.  This is a large 
difference between extinction 
and test phases, so expect 
renewal. 
 
I.e. Test phase responding high. 
Primary reward (sucrose) 
removed.  Secondary reward 
properties of dipper preserved as 
the dipper is not experienced 
without sucrose in extinction.  
Secondary reward can support 
responding at test. 
 
I.e. Test phase responding 
moderate. 
No-Dipper 
Cover 
Light 
to 
sucrose 
filled 
dipper 
Light alone 
& dipper 
magazine 
covered 
Light 
alone 
Extinction and test phases differ 
with in presence of cover, but 
are the same in the non-
operation of the dipper.  This is 
a smaller difference between 
extinction and test phases than 
in the Dipper Cover condition.  
So expect some renewal, but not 
as much as in Dipper Cover 
condition. 
 
I.e. Test phase responding 
moderate. 
Primary reward (sucrose) and 
secondary (dipper) removed.  
Neither primary nor secondary 
reward can support responding at 
test. 
 
I.e. Test phase responding low. 
Note 1: These predictions assume the cover completely blocks all access to the operation of the dipper.  As an operational means to ensure this assumption is accurate, in the 
both the Dipper Cover, and No-Dipper Cover conditions, the dipper would not be operated at all in the extinction phase.  
Note 2: Cells have been merged to highlight where predictions are not affected by the key manipulation.   
Note 3: Additional control conditions where the extinction phase takes place without a magazine cover (e.g. Dipper No-Cover and No-Dipper No-Cover) would be needed in 
order to establish the baseline level of responding, these have not been illustrated here as all accounts predict experimental extinction and negligible responding at test.   
  
Table 2 – Sign- vs Goal-tracking  
Condition Train Extinction Test Uncertainty &  
Causal Model 
Response Prevention Renewal Secondary Reinforcement 
Dipper 
Cover 
Measure 
sign-
tracking 
(lever 
press) Lever 
insertion  
 to 
sucrose 
filled 
dipper 
Lever 
alone & 
Dipper 
magazine 
covered 
Lever 
to 
empty 
dipper 
Status of reward 
uncertain in extinction 
phase – this protects 
light causes sucrose 
model.  Expression of 
causal model at test 
supports responding. 
 
I.e. Test phase 
responding moderate to 
high for lever and 
magazine entry 
(depending on degree 
of protection by 
uncertainty). 
 
Cover does not prevent 
lever response, 
therefore extinction 
from lever alone 
presentation expected. 
 
I.e. Test phase lever 
responding low. 
Local context for sign tracking 
response is lever, which is 
unchanged between extinction 
and test phase.  Unchanged 
local context attenuates renewal 
effect based on global context 
change due to extinction and 
test phases differing in presence 
of the cover and dipper 
operation.   
 
I.e. Test phase responding to the 
lever moderate. 
Primary reward (sucrose) 
removed.  Secondary reward 
properties of dipper protected 
by covering but high levels of 
orienting to lever may reduce 
experience of dipper as 
secondary reward.  Secondary 
reward can support responding 
at test to the extent it is 
experienced. 
 
I.e. Test phase responding to the 
lever moderate to low. 
Dipper 
Cover 
Measure 
goal-
tracking 
(magazine 
response) 
Cover prevents 
magazine response, 
therefore extinction 
effect of lever alone 
presentation reduced 
for this response. 
 
I.e. Test phase 
magazine responding 
high. 
Local context for goal tracking 
response is the magazine. 
Extinction and test phases 
differences (magazine cover and 
dipper operation) focused on 
magazine. This is a large 
difference between extinction 
and test phases so expect 
renewal. 
 
I.e. Test phase magazine 
responding high. 
Primary reward (sucrose) 
removed.  Secondary reward 
properties of dipper protected 
by covering.  Secondary reward 
can support responding at test. 
 
I.e. Test phase magazine 
responding moderate. 
Note1: This is a within-subject experiment with sign- and goal-tracking responses measured in all animals – however, the panels have been split to illustrate where different 
predictions are made for different response types.   
Note 2: As with the previous experiment, these predictions assume the cover completely blocks all access to the operation of the dipper.  As an operational means to ensure 
this assumption is accurate, in the Dipper Cover condition, the dipper would not be operated at all in the extinction phase.   
Note 3: Again, additional control conditions where the extinction phase takes place without a magazine cover would be needed in order to establish the baseline level of 
responding, these have not been illustrated here as all accounts predict experimental extinction and negligible sign or goal tracking responding at test.   
 
